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*Resident  Scholar,  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute During  the  summer  of  1996,  President  Clinton  signed  what  some  consider  to be the  most 
sweeping  welfare  reform  since  the  initial  adoption  of public  assistance  programs  in  1935.  This 
legislation,  known  by the  official  title  of the Personal  Responsibility  Act,  eliminates  the  traditional 
AFDC  program  which  was  an entitlement  and  offers  the  federal  portion  of  AFDC  spending  in the 
form  of  block  grants.  Initially,  AFDC  was  administered  through  a cooperative  arrangement 
between  the  states  and  the  national  government.  The  national  government  would  provide  on 
average  55 percent  of  funding  and  the  states  would  administer  the  programs  and  finance  the  rest. 
Although  the  national  government  would  promulgate  a set of regulations  governing  the 
administration  of AFDC,  it was  usually  left  to the  states  to set benefit  levels  and  establish 
eligibility  criteria,  so long  as they  met  the  minimum  standards  set by the  national  government. 
Beyond  these  minima,  states  were  always  free  to offer  more  assistance  and  other  types  of 
assistance  not  necessarily  provided  for  in AFDC.  This  meant  that  in spite  of uniform  minima,  there 
were  still  substantial  disparities  between  states.  Although  the  new  welfare  imposes  cumulative 
time  limits  and  requires  recipients  to participate  in work  programs,  the principal  difference 
between  the  old  welfare  and  the  new  welfare  is that  national  funding  is no longer  guaranteed; 
rather  it is subject  to the  annual  appropriation  process  in Congress.  Another  key  difference  is that 
the  funding  for  food  stamps  will  be reduced  by 28 billion  dollars  over  the  next  six years.  Because 
food  stamp  benefit  levels  were  based  on  income  levels,  those  who  received  less  in AFDC  could 
expect  to receive  more  in food  stamps.  Food  stamps  essentially  served  to equalize  disparities  in 
AFDC. 
1 Although  the  new  law  represents  a major  step  in the  direction  of  welfare  reform,  there  are 
any  number  of  flaws  that  still  have  yet  to be ironed  out.  Therefore,  it is my  purpose  in this  paper 
to look  at the  new  law  in the  context  offering  recommendations  for  improvement.  One  path  for 
improvement  might  be to  simply  appropriate  more  money  in those  areas  that  are deficient. 
Another  path  might  consist  of  incentives  to businesses  to hire  those  presently  on  welfare.  But  if 
the  administration  is truly  serious  about  improving  this  legislation,  it will  recognize  the 
opportunity  it finally  has  to create  new  institutional  structures  aimed  at generating  greater 
employment.  This  would  involve  no  less  than  breaking  down  bureaucratic  distinctions  between 
what  has  traditionally  been  referred  to as welfare  programs  and  what  are often  referred  to as 
employment  programs.  On  the  contrary,  the  opportunity  this  legislation  offers  to the  states  to 
effectively  create  employment  programs  is an opportunity  they  should  also  seize  to streamline 
programs  already  in place  for  assisting  the  unemployed  with  those  for  assisting  welfare  recipients. 
To  truly  end  welfare  as we  know  it would  involve  eliminating  the  concept  as we  have 
understood  it in large  measure  because  of  the  stigma  attached  to it (Gans,  1995).  But  as the  public 
increasingly  supports  the  idea  that  people  on  welfare  ought  to work,  it is now  time  to meet  those 
expectations  with  a real  commitment  to work.  Welfare,  then,  would  be replaced  with  a 
meaningful  program  of employment  which  would  have  broader  political  appeal  because  it would 
end  the  artificial  distinction  between  welfare  assistance  and  unemployment  insurance.  As  much  as 
there  is to detest  in the  new  law,  it should  not  obscure  the  potential  to develop  meaningful 
cooperative  partnerships  between  the  public  and  private  sectors.  As  the  new  law  requires  more 
recipients  to enter  the  labor  market,  the  public  sector  will  find  it necessary  to find  ways  in which  it 
along  with  the  private  sector  can  create  the job  opportunities  to absorb  them.  What  is often 
2 overlooked,  however,  is that  to do  this  would  cost  a considerable  amount  of  money  -- more  than 
is currently  being  appropriated.  Ultimately,  then,  it becomes  a test  of values  -- What  commitments 
are we  as a society  willing  to make  in order  to seriously  address  the  problem. 
The  New  Welfare 
Under  the  new  welfare,  the  entitlement  status  enjoyed  under  the  old  AFDC  system  no 
longer  exists.  Instead  Congress  will  allocate  to the  states  block  grants  to establish  welfare 
programs  that  best  meet  their  needs,  and  appropriations  will  be subject  to the  annual 
appropriations  process.  Although  the  new  law  is emphatic  in that  individuals  are no  longer  entitled 
to welfare,  it isn’t  clear  that  states  cannot  continue  to make  a claim  of  entitlement  on  the  grounds 
that  they  are  adhering  to  the  requirements  contained  in the  law.  But  in order  to receive  their 
grants,  they  must  follow  through  with  a whole  array  of  federal  regulations  and  report  annually  on 
the progress  of  implementation. 
The  old  welfare  was  essentially  a shared  program  between  the  states  and  the  national 
government.  Under  the  old  AFDC  program,  the  national  government  drew  up  some  uniform 
standards  that  were  to apply  across  the  board.  The  states  in turn  would  implement  the  program. 
The  national  government  would  on  average  finance  about  55 percent  of  benefits  with  the  states 
funding  the  rest.  So  long  as states  met  the  minimum  benefit  requirements,  they  were  free  to  set 
their  own  benefit  levels.  The  basic  purpose  of  the old  program  had  always  been  the  provision  of 
assistance  to children.  It was  not  set  up as a program  intended  to specifically  “move  people  from 
welfare  to work”  or  to provide  the  kinds  of  training  they  might  need  in order  to obtain  work.  It 
was  assumed,  however,  that  welfare  would  be temporary.  Moreover,  it was  assumed  that  the 
3 AFDC  caseload  would  be comprised  primarily  of widows  on  the  assumption  that  households  with 
men  wouldn’t  need  assistance  as their  men  would  simply  go out  and  work.  By  design,  then, 
AFDC  was  structured  so that  mothers  could  stay  at home  and  care  for  their  children  (Gordon, 
1994).  By  the  norms  of  the  1930s  it was  preferable  that  widows  of  good  moral  character  be  able 
to keep  their  children  at home  instead  of placing  them  in institutions  (Teles,  1996;  Katz,  1986). 
On  a practical  level,  however,  it wasn’t  so easy  to work.  Regulations  under  the  old 
program  often  discouraged  work  because  for  each  dollar  of earned  income  there  would  be  a 
corresponding  reduction  in benefits.  As welfare  recipients  would  earn  more,  their  benefits  would 
increasingly  approach  zero.  Similarly,  they  would  suffer  a reduction  in food  stamps.  And  if their 
income  exceeded  a certain  threshold,  they  would  suffer  the  loss  of  Medicaid  assistance  as well. 
Because  these  people  would  invariably  be left  worse  off  from  working,  it was  simply  unprofitable 
to work  as opposed  to collecting  public  assistance  (Bane  & Ellwood,  1994).  Also  because  most 
regulations  indicated  that  recipients  would  lose  benefits  were  they  to get  married,  many  simply 
found  it uneconomical  to do  so. This  however,  did  not  mean  that  states  weren’t  free  to 
experiment  and  attempt  to redesign  programs  aimed  at providing  greater  incentive  to  work  or 
requiring  something  in return  for  their  benefits.  On  the  contrary,  states  always  had  the  option  of 
applying  for  federal  waivers  that  would  effectively  exempt  them  from  many  of  these  regulations 
and  free  them  up  to experiment.  The  waiver  process  has  its origins  in the  Social  Security 
amendments  of  1962,  which  were  intended  to move  welfare  mothers  off  of welfare  and  into  the 
workforce  by offering  them  services  that  might  enable  them  to do  so. They  also  included 
provisions  for  demonstration  projects,  in which  the  Secretary  of Health  and  Human  Services  (then 
Health  Education  and  Welfare)  was  given  wide  discretion  without  necessarily  having  to seek  the 
4 approval  of  Congress  (Teles,  1996). 
The  stated  purpose  of  the  new  law  is to structure  a new  welfare  system  that  will  promote 
responsible  motherhood  and  fatherhood,  marriage  and  the  family  by providing  greater  flexibility  to 
states  so that  they  can  create  their  own  programs  intended  to meet  these  objectives.  Or to  state  it 
differently,  the  new  law  seeks  to end  welfare  as a way  of life  by requiring  recipients  to be self- 
sufficient,  even  under  the  threat  of  starvation.  After  two  years,  welfare  recipients  must  participate 
in work  programs,  and  they  may  not  collect  benefits  for more  than  five  years  in their  life  time.  The 
new  law  claims  to be a break  with  the  past  because  it aims  to bring  about  a reduction  in the 
welfare  caseload  by moving  people  from  welfare  to work.  But  insofar  as these  goals  were  initially 
expressed  in the  Family  Support  Act  of  1988,  it doesn’t  really  represent  a radical  departure.  The 
FSA  initially  sought  to move  people  from  welfare  to work  by mandating  participation  in the  JOBS 
program.  States  were  supposed  to  have  achieved  a participation  rate  of  20 percent  by  1996  for 
single  mothers  with  children  under  three,  and  a participation  rate  of  60 percent  for  two  parent 
families.  Under  this  program  those  recipients  who  participated  would  receive  training  and  other 
related  job  skills.  They  would  also  receive  child  care  assistance  and  the  continuation  of Medicaid, 
all of  which  would  be necessary  to enable  recipients  to take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to work. 
FSA,  however,  also  had  its  sticks.  Those  who  refused  to participate  could  be penalized  with  the 
loss  of  benefits,  and  the  law  mandated  measures  to enforce  child  support  from  non-custodial 
fathers.  But  FSA  continued  to be administered  by the  Department  of Health  and  Human  Services. 
FSA’s  principal  shortcomings  were  that  participation  levels  were  low  and  child 
exemptions  were  high.  Mothers  with  children  under  the  age  of three  could  be exempt  from 
participation  requirements  in work  programs.  But  despite  these  limitations,  states  were  never 
5 precluded  from  experimenting  with  their  own  reform  initiatives.  On the  contrary,  many  states  did 
indeed  experiment  through  the  federal  waiver  process.  The  Clinton  administration  -- which 
initially  promised  to end  welfare  as we know  it -- had  already  been  granting  waivers. 
Although  the  new  law  does  differ  in some  significant  ways  from  this  earlier  reform  -- 
which  in the  minds  of many  -- continued  to be associated  with  the old  AFDC  system  -- it certainly 
does  not  represent  a radical  departure,  for  many  of  the  state  programs  that  are  supposed  to result 
have  already  been  underway  due  to the  waiver  process.  This  is not  to mention  that  the  initial  FSA 
encouraged  reform  “experiments”  across  the  states  (Thompson  & Norris,  1995).  The  principal 
difference  is that  it ends  the  entitlement  status  of AFDC  and  thus  subjects  annual  funding  levels  to 
the  annual  appropriations  process.  Instead  of  the Department  of Health  and  Human  Services  being 
responsible  for  implementation,  the  states  now  implement  their  own  programs,  partially  funded  by 
federal  block  grants.  But  their  freedom  to devise  their  own  programs  is still  circumscribed  by  an 
array  of  bureaucratic  regulations.  The  key  points  are listed  below: 
.  States  are  to require,  not  later  than  one  year  of enactment,  a parent  or caretaker  receiving 
assistance  to participate  in community  service  employment  with  minimum  weekly  hours 
and  tasks  to be determined  by the  state. 
.  States  are  to operate  a child  support  enforcement  program. 
.  States  that  are  successful  in reducing  out-of-wedlock  births  will  be eligible  for  bonuses: 
$20,000,000  if there  are five  eligible  states  or $25,000,000  if there  are fewer  than  five 
eligible  states. 
.  States  receiving  grants  are  to impose  mandatory  work  requirements  and  are  to achieve 
minimum  participation  rates  by the  following  years:  25%  in  1997;  30%  in  1998;  35%  in 
1999;  40%  in 2000;  45%  in 2001;  and  50%  in 2002  and  thereafter. 
.  With  respect  to two-parent  families,  the  minimum  participation  rate  is to be higher:  75%  in 
1997  and  1998;  and  90%  in  1999  and  thereafter. 
6 For  those  individuals  and/or  families  who  refuse  to work,  states  may  either  reduce  or 
terminate  their  assistance.  A state,  however,  may  not  reduce  or terminate  assistance  if the 
individual  is a single  custodial  parent  caring  for children  under  six and  the  individual  has 
demonstrated  an inability  to find  needed  child  care. 
States  may  reduce  or deny  assistance  to those  deemed  to be  uncooperative  in efforts  to 
establish  paternity. 
Individuals  who  have  fraudently  misrepresented  residence  in order  to obtain  assistance  in 
two  or more  states  can  be denied  assistance  for  ten  years. 
States  are  to submit  annual  reports  to Congress  describing  whether  they  are increasing 
participation  rates  and  their  objectives  for  increasing  employment  and  earnings  of the 
needy  and  child  support  payments  and  decreasing  out-of-wedlock  pregnancies  and  child 
poverty. 
The  Secretary  of Health  and  Human  Services  shall  be required  to rank  states  according  to 
the  most  successful  and  the  least  successful  programs. 
Perhaps  one  of  the  most  significant  changes,  if not  most  controversial,  is the  denial  of 
public  assistance  to legal  immigrants.  Congress  justifies  this  restriction  on  the  contention  that  a 
basic  principle  in United  States  immigration  law  is self-sufficiency.  The  law  states  clearly  that  it is 
the  continuing  immigration  policy  of  the  United  States  that  aliens  in the  U.S.  not  be public 
charges,  and  that  the  availability  of public  funds  not  serve  as an incentive  for  immigration  to the 
U.S.  Therefore,  the  government  has  a strong  interest  in enacting  new  rules  for  eligibility  and 
sponsorship  agreements  to assure  that  aliens  will  be self-reliant  in accordance  with  national 
immigration  policy.  Under  the  new  law,  legal  immigrants  who  enter  this  country  on  or after  the 
enactment  of  this  act  are not  eligible  for  any  Federal  means-tested  public  benefit  for  a period  of 
five  years,  although  exceptions  are made  for  refugees  and  asylees.  Legal  immigrants  are ineligible 
from  receiving  SSI  and  food  stamps  until  they  attain  citizenship,  although  those  who  have  worked 
for  at least  ten  years  may  be exempted  from  benefits  restrictions. 
7 .  The  new  law  does,  however,  offer  additional  block  grants  to the  states  to develop  child 
care.  Under  the  old  law,  there  was  a child  care  and  development  block  grant  (CCDBG)  which 
consisted  of  two  components:  a discretionary  program  and  a mandatory  program.  For  1996, 
funding  for  the  discretionary  program  was  $935  million  and  $1.1  billion  for  the  mandatory 
program.  Under  the  new  law,  funding  for the  discretionary  program  will  be $1 billion  each  year 
between  1996  and  2002.  Funding  for  the  mandatory  program  will  begin  at $2 billion  in FY  1997 
and  rise  to a total  of  $13.85  billion  for  the  entire  1997-2002  period.  As  with  the  temporary  family 
assistance  component,  the  goal  is to allow  states  to have  flexibility  in developing  child  care 
programs  and  policies  that  best  meet  the  needs  of children  and  families  in their  states.  The  goal  is 
also  to promote  parental  choice  so that  parents  will  be able  to make  decisions  that  best  meet  their 
family’s  needs.  In order  to carry  out  these  objectives  an additional  $6 billion  over  six years  will  be 
appropriated.  Moreover,  each  state  shall  be entitled  to payments  for  the  purposes  of  providing 
child  care  assistance. 
If we  can  take  stock,  the  law  mandates  that  the  states  will  create  work  programs  and  will 
achieve  specific  targets  for  participation.  They  are  also  required  to develop  programs  to reduce 
out-of-wedlock  births  and  teenage  pregnancies  and  they  are  not  allowed,  unless  waivers  are given 
by the  Secretary  of Health  and  Human  Services,  to extend  benefits  beyond  the  time  limits  or to 
give  assistance  to legal  immigrants.  One  might  wonder,  then,  just  how  much  flexibility  the  states 
do  have?  While  the  states  do  have  the  discretion  to devise  work  programs  as they  see  fit,  their 
greatest  discretion  appears  to be in their  ability  to deny  benefits.  In conjunction  with  the  child  care 
provisions,  the  new  law  does  allow  states  the  option  of denying  food  stamp  benefits  to those  who 
fail  to cooperate  in the  establishment  of paternity  for  those  children  born  out  of  wedlock. 
8 Individuals  can  also  be considered  ineligible  in the  food  stamps  program  if they  haven’t 
participated  in  a work  program  20 hours  a week  or complied  with  the  requirements  of  a work 
program  as determined  by  a state  agency. 
And  lastly,  the  law  mandates  that  the  Secretary  of Health  and  Human  Services  is to 
establish  and  implement  a strategy  (no  later  than  January  1, 1997)  for  the  prevention  of out-of- 
wedlock  pregnancies  and  the  assurance  that  at least  25 percent  of communities  in  the  U.S.  have 
teenage  pregnancy  programs  in place.  The  Secretary  is then  to provide  annual  reports  to Congress 
with  regards  to progress  in meeting  these  goals. 
Effects? 
As  the  new  law  essentially  replaces  the  old  AFDC  and  its JOBS  component  with  a 
hodgepodge  of  state  programs,  a critical  question  is just  what  does  this  new  law  accomplish  that 
the  old  did  not.  In assessing  the  effects  there  are two  sides.  One  side  is the  immediate  impact  this 
legislation  will  have  on  both  the  welfare  population  and  the  states  that  must  now  develop  new 
programs  for  them.  The  other  side  is whether  it will  have  any  substantive  impact  on  poverty.  That 
is, will  it be more  successful  in reducing  the  number  of  people  in poverty  than  those  programs  it 
has replaced?  In terms  of  the  first  side,  it isn’t  entirely  clear  just  what  the  effects  of the  new 
welfare  will  be; only  time  will  tell.  Estimates,  however,  vary  according  to the  imperative  one 
attaches  to welfare  reform.  Critics  argue  that  it will  push  more  people,  especially  children  into 
poverty.  The  Center  on  Budget  and  Policy  Priorities  estimates  that  changes  in funding  could  result 
in greater  poverty  among  children.  They  cite  an Urban  Institute  report  that  finds  that  the  new  law 
will  push  1.1 million  children  and  2.6 million  overall  into  poverty  (Supor  et al.,  1996).  Although 
9 there  could  be  some  serious  welfare  experiments,  results  of  these  experiments  are  bound  to vary 
from  state  to  state.  The  ultimate  result  is an unknown,  but  what  is clear  is that  by  transferring  the 
major  responsibility  for  welfare  back  to the  states,  as well  as setting  the  stage  for  subsequent 
reductions  in welfare  block  grants,  Congress  has  found  a way  to cut  federal  spending.  In fact,  the 
Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)  estimates  that  federal  spending  will  be reduced  by $2.9 
billion  during  Fiscal  year  1997 and  by  54.2  billion  during  the  1997-2002  period  (CBO,  1996).  For 
those  who  believe  that  welfare  reform  is all about  reducing  federal  spending  for  the  purpose  of 
achieving  a balanced  budget,  this  legislation  might  be viewed  as a success.  But  this  is only  true  if 
it is believed  that  welfare  programs  add  up  to that  much  of  the  federal  budget,  which  they  do  not. 
Marmor  et al. note  that  federal  spending  on  means-tested  programs  amounted  to only  11.8 
percent  of  the  federal  budget  in  1988  (Marmor,  Mashaw  & Harvey,  1990,  p. 94) 
Supporters,  on  the  other  hand,  argue  that  it will  enable  state  governments  -- who 
traditionally  had  responsibility  for  implementation  -- to develop  grass  roots  programs  that  are 
better  suited  to  their  needs.  Moreover,  out  of the  spirit  of  what  Louis  Brandeis  once  referred  to as 
the  laboratories  of democracy,  states  can  perfect  programs  that  in time  may  become  models  to the 
nation.  Because  of the  waiver  process  some  states  have  already  developed  programs,  and  these 
are the  states  that  might  find  it easier  to implement  the  new  law,  as they  already  have  an 
infrastructure  in place.  Examples  of this  are Wisconsin,  Massachusetts  and  Minnesota.  Wisconsin, 
for  instance,  has  been  operating  a waiver  called  “Wisconsin  Works  W-2”  since  1993.  It is a work- 
based  program  that  seeks  to break  the  poverty  culture  of dependency  by requiring  welfare 
recipients  to work  as a means  of  achieving  self-sufficiency.  But  it also  offers  the  support  services 
essential  for  making  work  a viable  option. 
10 The  W-2  program,  and  others  like  it, consists  of four  basic  components:  Unsubsidized 
employment,  Subsidized  employment,  Community  Service  employment,  and  participation 
programs.  Under  unsubsidized  employment  efforts  are made  to steer  those  for  whom  it is possible 
into  private  sector  jobs.  Job  centers  in conjunction  with  private  staffing  agencies  attempt  to best 
match  program  participants  with  employer  needs.  In the  process  it is assumed  that  most 
participants  with  some  assistance  will  be  successful  in finding  private  sector  employment.  This 
assumption  isn’t  substantively  different  from  those  behind  recent  reforms  in the  unemployment 
insurance  (UI)  system  at the  national  level;  that  individuals  who  receive  job  search  assistance  are 
more  likely  to find  reemployment  than  those  who  do  not.  And  state  demonstration  projects  have 
indeed  shown  that job  search  does  reduce  unemployment  spells  by  an average  of one  week  (U.S. 
Department  of  Labor,  1995). 
Nevertheless,  in those  cases  where  individuals  are willing  to work  but  lack  sufficient 
background  there  is subsidized  employment.  These  are essentially  subsidized  jobs  on  a trial  basis 
in which  subsidies  are given  to employers  for  the purposes  of offsetting  some  of  the  initial  costs  of 
new  employee  training  and  supervision.  In Wisconsin  the  subsidy  averages  $300  per  month.  In 
Massachusetts,  employers  receive  $3.50  per  hour  for program  participants  for  the  first  nine 
months  and  $2.50  per  hour  for  the  next  three  months.  An  employer  in Massachusetts  cannot 
accept  more  than  ten percent  of his/her  employees  into  subsidized  employment.  Whereas  in 
Wisconsin  subsidized  employment  is not  to exceed  24 weeks  and  is expected  to result  in 
permanent  employment,  one  can  participate  in subsidized  employment  in Massachusetts  up  to 24 
weeks. 
For  those  who  cannot  be placed  in either  unsubsidized  or subsidized  employment,  there  is 
11 the  option  of community  service  employment  for  those  who  need  further  development  of  work 
habits  and  other  skills  necessary  to make  them  marketable  in the  labor  market.  In Wisconsin, 
recipients  are placed  in work  assignments  for durations  of  6-9 months  each  and  they  can  qualify 
for  more  than  one  assignment  up  to a maximum  of  24 months.  In Massachusetts,  participants  in 
community  service  positions  must  work  a minimum  of twenty  hours  per  week  in exchange  for 
their  benefits.  And  lastly,  for  those  who  legitimately  are unable  to perform  independent  self- 
sustaining  work,  even  in a community  service  job,  there  is a participation  program.  In Wisconsin, 
these  are,  for  the  most  part,  those  whose  application  for  Supplemental  Security  Income  (SSI)  is 
pending  or those  who  have  mental  or physical  disabilities.  Nonetheless,  it is assumed  that  they  do 
have  capabilities  and  therefore,  they  are expected  to engage  in some  work  activities  consistent 
with  those  capabilities. 
Work-based  programs  operate  on  the  premise  that  individuals  who  start  off  in community 
service  employment  will  progressively  move  up the  ladder,  first  into  subsidized  employment  and 
then  into  unsubsidized  employment.  In Wisconsin,  it is simply  determined  during  the  intake 
process  which  programs  recipients  will  participate  in.  Massachusetts  too  has  an intake  process 
where  it is determined  who  is exempt  and  who  is not  exempt  from  participation  in some  type  of 
work  requirements.  Upon  application  for  welfare  intake  workers  determine  whether  recipients  are 
exempt  or  not.  DTA  then  makes  available  a wide  array  of  services  including  Job  Readiness  and 
Job  Search.  Grantees  are informed  of job  openings,  including  those  jobs  available  through  the 
Department’s  Full  Employment  Program,  the  Department  of Employment  and  Training,  JTPA 
Agencies,  Regional  Employment  Boards  (REBs),  and  local  businesses.  But  perhaps  what  is 
critical  to both  programs  is that  they  are no  longer  viewed  as welfare  programs  per  se, but  as 
12 something  totally  different.  Both  Wisconsin  and  Massachusetts  have  changed  the  names  of  their 
departments  of  welfare.  For  Wisconsin  it is now  called  the  Department  of  Workforce 
Development  (DWD)  and  Massachusetts  is now  the  Department  of Transitional  Assistance 
(DTA). 
Although  there  is much  similarity  between  the  Wisconsin  and  Massachusetts  waivers, 
there  are some  differences  as well.  Massachusetts,  for  instance,  subjects  those  classified  as “non- 
exempt”  to a 2.75  percent  reduction  in their  cash  assistance  benefits.  But  those  same  families  will 
be permitted  to retain  more  of  their  earned  income.  Those  who  have  been  determined  to be non- 
exempt  and  who  have  received  assistance  for  sixty  days  are then  required  to work  a minimum  of 
twenty  hours  per  week.  In two-parent  households,  both  parents  are  subject  to  work  requirements, 
but  only  one  parent  is required  to work  if children  aren’t  of  school  age.  Those  who  are placed 
through  the  Full  Employment  Program  are to work  forty  hours  per  week,  but  they  cannot  be 
required  to work  more  nor  can  they  be used  to displace  regular  employees  or to  supplant  existing 
vacancies  previously  established.  Grantees  are to be paid  a minimum  of  $4SO/hr.  These  wages  are 
to be in lieu  of assistance  under  AFDC  and  food  stamps.  Also,  for  those  participating  in the  Full 
Employment  Program,  AFDC  and  the  cash  value  of food  stamps  are  to be pooled  and  used  to 
reimburse  employers  for  a portion  of  the  wages  they  pay  to grantees. 
Minnesota  too  has  tried  its own  waiver  called  the  Minnesota  Family  Investment  Program 
(MFIP)  which  it launched  in April  of  1994. Like  the  others,  it too  was  intended  to encourage 
work,  alleviate  poverty,  and  reduce  dependence  on  public  assistance.  MFIP  also  integrates  and 
replaces  several  of  the  old  welfare  programs  with  a program  aimed  at making  work  pay  for 
families  on  welfare.  This  is accomplished  primarily  by decreasing  the  extent  to which  families’ 
13 welfare  grants  are reduced  when  they  work.  MFIP  also  pays  child  care  expenses  directly  to the 
provider,  which  relieves  participants  of  up-front  costs. 
Whereas  the  other  two  programs  attempt  to make  early  determinations  with  regards  to 
who  will  be exempt  and  who  will  not,  MFIP  essentially  distinguishes  between  long-term  and 
short-term  welfare  recipients  in a way  similar  to recent  changes  in the  UI  laws  which  attempt  to 
identify  those  most  likely  to exhaust  their  benefits.  Those  identified  as long-term  are then  required 
to participate  in intensive  employment  and  training  services,  which  are specifically  focused  on  the 
long-term  who  are less  likely  than  others  to find  jobs  without  assistance  and  who  also  account  for 
a large  share  of  welfare  expenditures.  Single  parents  who  have  received  welfare  for  24 out  of  the 
last  36 months  and  two-parent  families  that  have  received  welfare  for  six out  of  the  last  twelve 
months  are required  to participate.  Instead  of dealing  with  several  programs,  recipients  now  only 
have  to deal  with  one  bureaucracy,  thereby  increasing  efficiency.  But  the  major  goals  of  MFIP  are 
the  promotion  of  employment,  the  reduction  of poverty,  and  the  reduction  of dependence  on 
welfare  as the  primary  sources  of income.  In an assessment  of  this  program,  the  MDRC  found 
that  MFIP  decreased  the  share  of  single-parent  recipients  who  were  no  longer  receiving  welfare 
by 4.3 percentage  points  and  increased  the  share  of  those  who  were  officially  combining  work  and 
welfare  by  14.3 percentage  points.  MFIP  increased  the  share  of  recipients  who  were  either  not  on 
welfare  or combining  work  and  welfare  by  10.1 percentage  points  (Knox,  Brown  & Lin,  1995). 
Although  there  are differences  between  these  programs  to be sure,  what  they  appear  to 
share  in common  is an attempt  to break  the  poverty  culture  of dependency  through  the  creation  of 
work  programs.  They  are essentially  centered  on  work-based  reform,  and  were  each  state  to 
adopt  a work-based  program  along  these  lines,  the  nation  might  well  be on  its  way  towards 
14 effective  welfare  reform.  And  to a large  extent,  they  embody  many  of  the  concepts  contained  in 
the  earlier  FSA,  in as much  as they  strive  to move  people  from  welfare  to work  by providing  the 
types  of  services  that  will  enable  them  to do  so. On  the  other  hand,  insofar  as they  may  involve 
subsidies  to employers,  the  question  remains  with  regards  to what  happens  after  the  subsidies  run 
out.  Although  some  of  the  programs  attempt  to offer  some  technical  training  to the  hard  core 
unemployable,  it would  appear  that  a major  underlying  premise  of  all these  efforts  is an 
assumption  that  what  these  recipients  need  the  most  -- more  than  specific  skills  development  -- is 
the  development  of  work  habits.  So even  after  subsidies  run  out  and  they  are  ultimately  let  go, 
they  will  have  developed  the  type  of  work  habits  that  can  make  them  more  attractive  in the  labor 
market.  And  yet,  it doesn’t  follow  that  there  will  be any  more  jobs  available  to them  at that  point 
than  have  been  available  in the  past.  On  the contrary,  work  and/or  training  requirements  only 
address  one  aspect  of  an unemployment  problem,  mainly  the  supply  of  skilled  labor.  They  do  not 
address  the  other  side  of  the  unemployment  issue  -- the  demand  for  labor  (Marmor,  Mashaw  & 
Harvey,  1990,  p.  121). 
Still,  work-based  reform  along  these  lines  would  cost  the  nation  considerably  more  than  it 
has  been  spending.  The  expected  cost  in Wisconsin,  for  instance,  for  Fiscal  year  1997-1998  is 
$1.091  billion,  of which  $653  million  is from  federal  bock  grants.  This  means  that  the  difference 
comes  from  state  funds.  For  1995,  there  were  72,366  AFDC  cases  in Wisconsin.  To  spend  this 
entire  budget  on  the  entire  caseload  means  that  the  cost  per  case  is roughly  $15,070.  Were  we  to 
attempt  to implement  this  plan  nationwide,  we could  expect  to see  costs  increase  to approximately 
$72.6  billion.’  Even  with  the cutoff  of legal  immigrants,  it could  still cost  $67.5  billion2  Under 
the old  welfare,  AFDC  spending  in  1995 was  roughly  $22  billion  of which  $12  billion  came  from the  federal  government  and  $10  billion  came  from  the  states.3 Federal  spending  on  the  JOBS 
component  of  the  FSA  alone  was  capped  at $1 billion.  The  nation  was  spending  another  $25 
billion  on  food  stamps  and  another  $25  billion  still  on  the Earned  Income  Tax  Credit  (EITC). 
Although  there  are  supposed  to be reductions  in food  stamps,  most  of  that  budget  will  remain  in 
tact.  The  EITC  budget  can  also  be expected  to remain  in tact.  According  to the  CBO,  the  base 
level  of the  federal  block  grant  is to be fixed  at  16.4 billion  annually  through  2002.  Still,  states 
would  essentially  be required  to come  up  with  the remainder.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the 
new  law  only  requires  states  to  spend  at a rate  equal  to  80 percent  of  what  they  were  spending 
under  the  old  law.  Given  that  federal  funding  for  cash  assistance  is expected  to be frozen  for  the 
next  five  years,  it may  be difficult  for  states  to maintain  existing  benefits  in  the  event  that  poverty 
grows  either  as a result  of recession  or changing  demographics.  There  are provisions  for  a Rainy 
Day  Fund  that  would  allow  states  to borrow  during  recessionary  periods,  but  it is doubtful  that 
federal  funds  will  be increased  to absorb  those  who  otherwise  would  be covered  under  the  old 
law.  States  might  find  themselves  in the  position  of  having  to choose  between  using  their  own 
money  to sustain  welfare  programs,  restricting  entry,  or cutting  back  benefits  (Peterson,  1996). 
In the  immediate  short  term  we  could  expect  to see  states  implementing  portions  of  this 
law  on  at least  $2 billion  less.  It should  also  be noted  that  the  Wisconsin  program,  and  others  like 
it, rely  heavily  on  wage  subsidies  from  the  EITC.  Program  costs,  however,  are over  and  above 
EITC  costs.  The  legislation  does  provide  for  $14  billion  in child  care  funding  as well  as strict  new 
child  support  enforcement  measures,  and  it is estimated  that  stricter  child  support  will  raise  an 
additional  $24  billion.  Even  if we could  assume  all this  to be true  and  add  to the  16.4 billion  the 
federal  government  might  continue  to spend  through  block  grants  another  38 billion,  we  would 
16 still  be  short  about  $18  billion.  High  costs  states  are going  to  be hurt  more  than  low  cost  states. 
But  already  those  states  with  a history  of low  provision  like  Alabama  and  Louisiana  find 
themselves  with  greater  relative  shortfalls.  This  can  be  seen  below  in Table  I. 
Table  I State  Comparisons  by Grant,  Estimated  Costs  and  Shortfall 
State  Grant 
Alabama  93,006,115 
Alaska  63,609,072 
Arizona  222,419,988 
Arkansas  56,732,858 
California  3,733,8  17,740 
Colorado  135,553,187 
Connecticut  266,788,107 
Delaware  32,290,98  1 
District  of  Columbia  92,609,8  15 
Florida  560,955,558 
Georgia  330,741,739 
Hawaii  98,904,788 
Idaho  31,851,236 
Illinois  585,056,960 
Indiana  206,799,109 
Iowa  130,088,040 
Kansas  101,931,061 
Kentucky  18 1,287,669 
Louisiana  163,971,985 
Maine  78,120,889 
Maryland  229,098,032 
Massachusetts  459,371,116 
Michigan  775,352,858 
Minnesota  266,397,597 
Mississippi  86,767,578 
Missouri  214,581,689 
Montana  45,534,006 
Nebraska  58,028,579 
Nevada  43,976,750 
New  Hampshire  38,521,261 
New  Jersey  404,034,823 
New  Mexico  126,103,156 
New  York  2,359,975,147 
North  Carolina  302,239,599 
Estimated  Cost  Short$all 
708,290,OOO  615,283,885 
180,840,OOO  117,230,928 
1,054,900,000  832,480,002 
361,680,OOO  304,947,142 
13,849,330,000  IO,1 15,512,260 
587,730,OOO  452,176,813 
919,270,000  652,48  1,893 
165,770,OOO  133,579,019 
406,890,OOO  3 14,280,185 
3,45 1,030,000  2,890,074,442 
2,094,730,000  1,763,988,261 
33 1,540,ooo  232,635,2  12 
135,630,OOO  103,778,764 
3,556,520,000  2,971,146,304 
994,620,OOO  787,820,891 
542,520,OOO  412,431,960 
42 1,960,OOO  320,028,939 
1,130,250,000  948,962,33  1 
1,205,600,000  1,041,628,884 
33 1,540,000  253,419,ooo 
1,115,180,000  886,08  1,968 
1,507,000,000  1,047,628,884 
3,029,070,000  2,253,717,142 
858,999,OOO  592,592,403 
783,640,OOO  696,872,422 
1,341,230,000  1,126,648,311 
180,840,OOO  135,305,994 
226,050,OOO  168,021,421 
24 1,120,OOO  197,143,250 
165,770,000  127,248,739 
1,793,330,000  1,389,295,177 
527,450,OOO  401,346,844 
6,886,990,000  4,527,014,853 
1,898,820,000  1,596,580,401 
17 North  Dakota  25888,452  75,350,ooo  59,46 1,548 
Ohio  727,968,260  3,435,960,000  2,707,99  1,740 
Oklahoma  148,013,558  678,150,OOO  530,136,442 
Oregon  167,924,513  587,730,OOO  419,805,487 
Pennsylvania  7 19,499,305  3,089,450,000  2,369,850,695 
Rhode  Island  95,02  1,587  33 1,540,000  236,5  18,423 
South  Carolina  99,967,824  738,430,OOO  638,462,176 
South  Dakota  21,893,519  90,420,000  68,526,48  1 
Tennessee  189,787,994  1,446,720,000  1,256,932,006 
Texas  486,256,752  4,114,110,000  3,627,853,248 
Utah  74,952,014  256,190,OOO  181,237,986 
Vermont  47,353,181  150,700,000  103,346,8  19 
Virginia  158,285,172  1,085,040,000  926,754,828 
Washington  399,636,861  1,537,140,000  1,137,503,139 
West  Virginia  110,176,3  10  572,660,OOO  462,483,690 
Wisconsin  318,188,410  1,115,180,000  796,99  1,590 
Wvomine  2 1.7 8 1.446  75.350.00Q  53.568.554 
Total  16,389,114,288  72,501,770,000  56,112,655,712 
Source:  The  first  column  is from  the  Department  of Health  and  Human  Services’  State 
allocation  sheet  downloaded  from  the  Internet.  The  second  column  are  author’s 
calculations  based  on  multiplying  $15,070  per  case  by the  state  caseload  for  1995.  The 
caseload  figures  come  from  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means,  1996  Green  Book  (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1996),  pp.  462- 
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It should  be noted  that  shortfalls  may  be overstated  because  the  actual  grants  do  not  reflect  child 
care  assistance  and  other  block  grants.  Still,  were  smaller  states  to have  to come  up  with  the 
difference,  many  could  find  their  fiscal  capacities  strained  considerably.  Although  larger  and 
wealthier  states  like  California  and  New  York  might  be able  to mobilize  greater  resources,  they 
still  face  considerable  shortfalls.  As  mentioned  earlier,  those  states  that  already  have  a history  of 
low  welfare  provision  under  the  old  AFDC  system,  along  with  those  who  haven’t  attempted 
anything  under  the  waiver  process,  could  have  the  most  difficulty  in implementing  provisions  of 
the  new  law.  It is perhaps  in  these  states  where  we could  see  the  greatest  race  to the  bottom.  At 
the  same  time,  it should  also  be noted  that  shortfalls  for  high  immigrant  states  like  New  York  and 
18 California  may  also  be overstated,  as figures  for overall  caseloads  currently  reflect  the  mix  of legal 
immigrants  along  with  native  born  Americans. 
The  other  question  is just  what  the  effects  might  be on  poverty.  Here  the  question  might 
be whether  this  new  law  connects  in any  way  with  what  we  know  about  poverty  and  people  on 
welfare.  The  assumption  of the  law  is that  people  are on  welfare  because  in many  cases  they  had 
children  out  of  wedlock  and  as teenagers.  Because  they  became  pregnant  they  were  forced  to 
drop  out  of  school  and  thus  they  lack  many  of the  skills  necessary  to obtain  jobs  paying  above  the 
minimum  wage.  That  Congress  finds  the  caseloads  to have  increased  at a time  when  out-of- 
wedlock  births  and  teenage  pregnancies  also  increased  doesn’t  mean  that  one  is the  cause  of 
poverty.  What  it does  reflect  is the  belief  that  those  on  welfare  have  different  behavioral  traits  than 
those  considered  to be part  of the  mainstream  middle  class. 
Research  on  poverty  is unfortunately  divided  into  partisan  schools  of  thought:  economic  v. 
behavioral.  The  economic  school  essentially  argues  that  those  on  welfare  are poor  because  they 
lack  the  skills  necessary  to obtain  jobs  that  will  lift  them  out  of  poverty,  and  that  those  jobs  that 
do exist  simply  do  not  pay  much  above  the minimum  wage.  Given  that  these  individuals  will  not 
be any  better  off  from  working  in contrast  to a social  safety  net  that  offers  them  more  than  jobs  at 
the  bottom  end  of  the  pay  scale,  there  is no rational  reason  to forsake  welfare  for  work  (Bane  & 
Ellwood,  1994;  Murray  1984).  Were  we  to live  in a stronger  economy  in which  more  better 
paying  jobs  were  available,  there  would  be fewer  people  living  in poverty.  At  the  same  time,  it is 
recognized  that jobs  do  exist  at the  bottom  end  of  the  pay  scale.  Rather  the  problem  is that  most 
people  on  welfare  will  not  qualify  for  anything  better  (Burtless,  1995).  Much  of  the  economic 
school  is buttressed  by  studies  demonstrating  the  relationship  between  income  and  educational 
19 attainment  (Murnane,  1994;  Card  & Krueger,  1992a  &  1992b;  Card  & Sullivan,  1988;  Freeman  & 
Holzer,  1986).  And  they  are further  reinforced  by a literature  illustrating  a widening  gap  in income 
distribution  (Danziger  & Gottschalk,  1995;  Wolff,  1994;  Hungerford,  1993;  Levy,  1988). 
The  behavioral  school  suggests  that  people  are poor  because  of  their  own  personal 
defects.  It is a throwback  to an earlier  era  when  “deserving”  or “worthy”  poor  were  distinguished 
from  the  “undeserving”  or “unworthy”  poor.  The  worthy  poor  were  usually  the  elderly,  widows, 
the  disabled  and  children  -- those  who  were  poor  through  no  fault  of  their  own.  The  unworthy 
poor  were  the  able-bodied  who  did  not  work  because  they  were  lazy.  Jobs  do  exist  and  the 
primary  reason  why  people  don’t  work  is because  they  haven’t  properly  been  socialized  into  the 
work  ethic.  Had  public  assistance  programs  made  it clear  just  what  was  required  of  the  poor  -- 
such  as work  for  example  -- many  of the  pathologies  plaguing  the  inner  city  that  we  commonly 
associate  with  welfare  might  simply  not  exist  (Banfield,  1974;  Mead,  1986;  Kaus,  1992). 
If it is true  that  poverty  in the  U.S.  is a self-reinforcing  culture  rooted  in a set of 
permissive  social  policies,  the  new  law  will  certainly  force  people  to look  elsewhere  for 
subsistence.  But  if poverty  is a function  of insufficient  jobs  coupled  with  a lack  of educational 
attainment,  it is hard  to see  how  this  law  will  improve  the  situation.  In truth,  poverty  may  be  a 
function  of both.  Wilson,  for  instance,  has  argued  that  many  of  those  who  comprise  what  we  now 
refer  to as the  “underclass”  migrated  to the  cities  from  the  rural  farms  in the  South  in  search  of 
higher  paying  industrial  production  jobs.  As  they  were  migrating  north,  the  economy  was 
undergoing  a shift  with  many  of  the  industrial  jobs  moving  out  of  the cities,  first  to the  suburbs 
and  then  out  of  the  country.  With  no jobs  left  in  the  inner  city  and  no  way  to  get  out  to them  in 
the  suburbs,  these  people  were  left  in ghettoes  with  no economic  prospects.  But  along  with  the 
20 jobs,  positive  role  models  for  work  and  appropriate  patterns  of  socialization  disappeared  as well 
(Wilson,  1987).  Even  Mead,  a strong  proponent  of the  behavioral  school  maintains  that  the  new 
law  backs  away  from  a true  commitment  to work  (Mead,  1996).  A look  at the  demographics  of 
the  1994  AFDC  population,  for  instance,  suggests  that  some  aspects  of each  model  might  have 
some  currency. 
Table  II Demographics  of AFDC  Population 
Average  Family  Size  (persons) 












Basis  for  eligibility  (percent  children) 
Parents  present: 
Incapacitated 
Unemployed 
Parents  absent: 
Death 
Divorce  or  separation 
No  marriage  tie 
Other  reason 
Unknown 
Education  of  mother  (percent  of  mothers) 
8th  Grade  or  less 
l-3  years  of  HS 
High  School  Degree 
Some  College 
College  Graduate 
Unknown 
Age  of mother  (percent  of  mothers) 
Under  20 
20  to 24 

















21 30 to  39 
40  or over 
Unknown 
Age  of  Children  (percent  of recipient  children) 
Under  3 
3 to  5 
6to  11 
12 and  over 
Unknown 
Mother’s  employment 
Full-time  job 
Part-time  job 
status  (percent) 
Presence  of  Income  (percent  families) 
With  earnings 
No  non-AFDC  income 
Median  months  on  AFDC  since  most  recent  opening  22.8 




Native  American 
Asian 
Other  or unknown 
Incidence  of  households  (percent) 
Living  in public  housing 
Participating  in food  stamps 
or donated  food  program 
Including  nonrecipient  members 
Father’s  relationship  to youngest  child  (percent) 
No  father 
Natural  father 
Adoptive  father 
Stepfather 


























What  particularly  stands  out  is that  a significant  proportion  of  the  welfare  mothers  do  not  have  a 
22 significant  level  of educational  attainment  that  would  qualify  them  for jobs  paying  much  more  than 
minimum  wage.  This  would  imply  the  need  for  basic  education  programs.  But  given  that  a 
sizeable  population  have  children  below  the  age  of five,  policy  must  seriously  address  the  issue  of 
child  care.  Although  the  new  law  assumes  child  care  to be a critical  component  in the  ability  of 
welfare  mothers  to move  from  welfare  to work,  it isn’t  clear  that  it is being  addressed  correctly.  It 
still  assumes  that  child  care  is a problem  stemming  from  the  failure  of fathers  to pay  their  child 
support.  Certainly  tough  enforcement  may  help  some  mothers  to live  above  the  poverty  line,  but  it 
doesn’t  necessarily  furnish  the  facilities  to watch  children  while  their  mothers  go  out  to work. 
More  to the  point,  however,  it isn’t  clear  that  tough  enforcement  of child  support  will  produce 
that  much  more  money  if many  of these  fathers  are either  unemployed  or in low  wage  jobs 
themselves. 
Implications 
The  problem  with  relying  on  states  to devise  their  own  programs  is that  there  is no 
guarantee  that  they  will  opt  for  one  as ambitious  as some  of  the  serious  work-based  programs 
already  out  there.  On  the  contrary,  given  the  fiscal  constraints  in most  states,  it is more  likely  that 
they  will  opt  to perform  the  minimum  requirements  under  the  law.  The  new  law  does  allow  them 
wide  discretion  in denying  people  whatever  assistance.  Even  those  states  that  opt  for  strong 
work-based  plans,  we  shouldn’t  be surprised  if attempts  are made  to limit  eligibility  for  those 
components  offering  the job  training. 
And  yet,  much  of  the emphasis  of the  new  welfare  is on  work  and  training  requirements. 
Although  an important  subtext  is that  much  of the  poverty  suffered  is a function  of insufficient 
23 education  and  skills,  it isn’t  at all clear  that  there  is any  more  of  a commitment  to develop  training 
programs  now  than  was  the  case  in the  past.  Rather  the  emphasis  appears  to  be on  the 
development  of “proper”  work  habits.  Still,  the  question  remains  as to just  what  lessons  can  be 
drawn  from  training  programs.  In  a fairly  recent  study  by the  Department  of Labor,  it was  noted 
that  some  types  of programs  are  indeed  more  successful  than  others.  As  part  of  a study  designed 
to explore  the  merits  of worker  profiling  for unemployment  insurance  recipients,  New  Jersey 
conducted  a demonstration  project  -- the  New  Jersey  Unemployment  Insurance  Reemployment 
Demonstration  Project  (NJIRDP)  -- where  it looked  at three  different  treatments:  job  search 
assistance(JSA)  only  JSA  combined  with  training  or relocation  assistance,  and  JSA  combined  with 
cash  bonuses  for  early  reemployment.  Overall  each  treatment  reduced  the  amount  of UI  benefits 
received  both  in the  initial  benefit  year  and  in subsequent  years.  Though  a relatively  small  number 
of claimants  in  the  JSA  plus  training  or relocation  treatment  received  on-the-job  training,  those 
who  did  had  a significantly  higher  earnings  than  did  the  assessed  JSA  only  claimants  in all quarters 
following  the  first  quarter  after  the  claim  date.  It was  found  that  on-the-job  training  had  both  a 
substantial  and  statistically  significant  impact  on  earnings  and  weeks  worked  throughout  the  six- 
year  follow-up.  The  estimated  impact  on  earnings  was  equal  to  $9,000  to $15,000  per  year,  and 
the  estimated  impact  on  additional  weeks  worked  was  twelve  to eighteen  . By  contrast,  the  JSA 
only  group  did  do  better  than  the  control  group,  but  not  as well  as the  subgroup  of  JSA  plus 
training  that  received  on-the-job  training.  Here  it was  estimated  that  members  of  this  group 
increased  their  earnings  by an average  of $608  relative  to members  in the  control  group.  With 
another  $128  in additional  fringe  benefits,  the  total  increase  was  equal  to $736  in compensation 
(Department  of  Labor,  1995).  As  welfare  bureaucracies  will  be forced  to engage  in  serious 
24 profiling,  a case  could  be made  that  a strong  training  component  on  top  of  it could  be  useful.  At 
the  same  time,  however,  it isn’t  entirely  clear  that  training  programs  per  se are  the  most  cost 
efficient  means  of achieving  an objective. 
In  a study  of JOBSTARTS,  one  of the  Job  Training  Partnership  (JTPA)  programs  targeted 
specifically  at youths  who  were  school  dropouts,  the  Manpower  Development  Research 
Corporation  (MDRC)  found  the  effects  to be mixed.  Among  the  provisions  of  the  FSA  of  1988 
were  increased  educational  services  for  young  women  receiving  AFDC.  The  1992  amendments  to 
the  JTPA  had  created  a separate  year-round  youth  program  known  as JOBSTARTS  requiring  that 
those  youth  with  serious  barriers  to employment  and/or  young  school  dropouts  be provided  with 
increased  educational  services.  The  goals  of JOBSTART  were  to increase  participation  in 
education  and  training  activities  by a group  who  otherwise  would  be little  served.  The  goal  of  the 
JOBSTART  evaluation  was  to estimate  the  difference  that  access  to programs  made  for  its target 
population.  What  the  evaluation  showed  was  that  the  overall  impact  of JOBSTART  on  earnings 
for  a 48 month  impact  sample  was  a statistically  insignificant  gain  of  $214  or  1.3 percent  of what 
they  would  have  earned  over  four  years  had  they  not  had  access  to JOBSTART  at all. Those  in 
the  experimental  group  earned  on  average  $17,010  while  those  in the  control  group  earned  on 
average  $16,796. 
At  the  same  time,  there  were  differential  impacts  on  different  groups.  Custodial  mothers, 
for  instance,  in the  experimental  group  had  a gain  of  $625  or 7.5  percent  over  their  control 
group’s  mean  of  $8,334.  For  other  women  in the  experimental  group,  the  gain  was  smaller  -- 
$613  or  4.6  percent  of  their  control  group’s  mean  of  $13,310.  For  men,  however,  there  was 
actually  a loss.  Men  actually  lost  $273  or  1.2 percent  of  their  control  group’s  mean  of  $23,637. 
25 Still,  this  has  to be weighed  against  the  average  cost  per  experimental  in delivering  JOBSTART 
services  -- including  intake,  education,  training,  job  placement  assistance,  counseling  and  life  skills 
workshops  -- which  ran  from  $4,000  to  $5,500,  depending  on  the  site.  In New  York  City,  for 
instance,  the  average  cost  ran  as high  as $7,500.  This  would  be measured  against  the  average  cost 
of  $3,839  per  pupil  for  public  education  during  1985-86  school  year  -- the  first  year  of  operation 
for  the  JOBSTART  program  (Cave,  Bos,  Doolittle  & Tousant,  1993).  Given  that  most  of  the 
welfare  caseload  is comprised  of custodial  mothers,  many  of whom  never  finished  school,  services 
like  this  might  be beneficial. 
Given  that  societal  norms  may  have  changed,  particularly  with  regards  to the  expectation 
that  mothers  will  stay  at home  and  it is indeed  demanded  that  they  work,  it is perhaps  time  to end 
the  artificial  distinction  between  employment  policy  and  welfare  policy.  Instead  of increasing 
funding  for  existing  programs,  the  administration  might  want  to consider  appropriating  more 
money  for  these  efforts.  Despite  the  mixed  results  of job  training  , they  are  still  going  to be useful 
for  some  people.  Therefore,  the  Administration  might  want  to look  at ways  for  which  existing  job 
training  programs  could  be streamlined  with  these  efforts  as well.  If implemented  correctly,  states 
would  essentially  be embarking  on  more  comprehensive  employment  programs.  The  key,  then, 
would  be to add  greater  unity  and  coherence  to them.  Also,  given  that  the  new  welfare  is no  less 
regulatory  than  the  old,  it might  not  be  unreasonable  to require  that  all states  model  their  own 
programs  along  these  three  work-based  plans.  Those  who  do  it sooner  might  even  be offered 
bonuses  for  doing  so. The  only  apparent  obstacle,  then,  would  be coming  up  with  the  funds  to pay 
for  it. But  given  recent  reform  of  the  unemployment  insurance  system  (UI),  with  the 
Unemployment  Compensation  Amendments  of  1993, this  task  may  not  be as complicated  as it 
26 might  seem. 
These  amendments  established  a system  of  Worker  profiling  whereby  individuals  upon 
filing  for  UI  benefits  are profiled  according  to their  demographic  characteristics  and  the 
characteristics  of  their  occupations  and  industries  in efforts  to identify  those  likely  to be 
unemployed  for  long  periods  of  time.  Those  so identified  are then  targeted  for job  search 
assistance.  In  an earlier  brief,  I argued  that  the  UI  system  could  form  the  basis  upon  which  the 
long-term  unemployed  receive  training  in order  to better  meet  the  new  demands  of  the  labor 
market.  Also  that  this  training  could  be provided  by offering  vouchers  -- which  would  in part 
come  from  the  long  term  UI  benefits  the  long-term  unemployed  would  have  received  -- to 
employers  to offer  on-the-job  training.  This  way  employers  would  be able  to train  their  workers  in 
those  ways  that  best  meet  their  needs  (Levin-Waldman,  1996). 
This  concept  of offering  vouchers  or  subsidies  to employers  is something  that  both 
Wisconsin  and  Massachusetts  have  already  embraced.  Moreover,  the  President  has  indicated  that 
he may  looking  for  incentives  in the  form  of vouchers  to employers  to hire  welfare  recipients. 
Phelps  has  suggested  that  subsidies  would  be  a good  way  of  stimulating  demand  for  low-wage 
labor  (Phelps,  1994).  Danziger  and  Gottschalk  too  note  that  the  lowering  of  costs  to employers 
of hiring  a specific  group  could  be beneficial  in two  ways:  Firms  might  now  find  it more  profitable 
to hire  the  subsidized  less-skilled  workers  instead  of  the  more  skilled  workers.  And  the  reduction 
of total  costs  might  enable  firms  to expand  their  output.  Whereas  the  former  could  be directly 
beneficial  to the  welfare  population  specifically,  the  latter  could  ultimately  be beneficial  to all 
groups  including  the  less  skilled  workers.  But  as they  further  argue,  two  conditions  would  have  to 
be met.  First,  firms  would  have  to be able  to easily  substitute  among  different  types  of  workers. 
27 And  second,  the  employer  must  not  take  the  subsidy  as an indication  that  the  workers’ 
productivity  is low.  And  yet  evidence  on  subsidies  to employers  isn’t  very  promising.  They  note 
that  when  Congress  passed  the  Target  Jobs  Tax  credit  (TJTC)  and  the  Youth  Incentive 
Entitlement  Pilot  Projects  targeted  towards  employers  in the  inner  cities,  there  were  few 
employers  willing  to participate.  Rather,  employers  may  have  been  unresponsive  because  they 
may  have  viewed  the  subsidy  as an indication  that  these  workers  simply  were  not  good  employees 
(Danziger  & Gottschalk,  1995,  pp. 166- 168). But  despite  previous  efforts  at employer  subsidies,  it 
is probably  the  case  that  they  may  still be essential  inducements  for  employers  to participate  in the 
types  of cooperative  partnerships  with  public  officials  that  will  necessarily  move  recipients  from 
welfare  to work.  Still,  it should  be noted  that  the  provision  of  subsidies  wouldn’t  ensure  the 
continuation  of employment  after  the  subsidy  period  ends. 
At the  same  time,  if we could  end  the  welfare/unemployment  distinction  and  simply  offer 
training  vouchers  to workers,  current  welfare  recipients  might  find  that  they  have  an easier  time 
because  the  stigma  no  longer  exists.  Therefore,  it would  seem  logical  to look  towards  the  current 
UI  system  for  the  resources  necessary  to implement  more  comprehensive  employment  programs. 
At a minimum,  the  law  ought  to be toughened  to require  all states  to promote  job  search 
assistance.  In the  end,  this  could  prove  to be more  effective  than  simple  workfare.  A truly 
streamlined  welfare/work  bureaucracy  would  ultimately  give  substance  to the  Employment  Act  of 
1946  whereby  the  objective  of policy  would  be to ensure  that  all those  who  want  to work  are able 
to do  so. A work-based  policy  would  embody  the  following  principles: 
.  All  assistance  programs  are predicated  on  the  notion  that  people  need  to work.  The  goal 
of public  policy  is to provide  opportunity;  not  entitlement. 
28 .  Unemployment  Offices  should  no longer  distinguish  between  those  who  were  recently  laid 
off  and  those  who  have  been  on  welfare.  Each  applicant  should  be evaluated  on  the  basis 
of what  services  each  would  need  in order  to obtain  employment. 
.  Demographic  profiling  ought  to be used  to identify  those  most  likely  to have  the  greatest 
difficulty  in obtaining  work.  They  should  be targeted  for education  and  training  types  of 
programs. 
.  Existing  unemployment,  job  training  and  welfare  budgets  and  bureaucracies  should  be 
combined  into  single  programs,  albeit  they  may  be administered  separately  by the  states. 
.  If subsidies  are  what  it takes  to get  employers  to take  a chance,  it is probably  a better 
expenditure  of money  than  simply  paying  individuals  directly  to sit at home  and  do 
nothing. 
What  I am  suggesting,  then,  is that  welfare  bureaucracies  can  be streamlined  with 
employment  bureaucracies.  Congress,  to some  extent,  has  already  done  this  with  its recent 
passage  of the  Workforce  Development  Act,  which  consolidates  Federal  employment  training 
programs  and  creates  a new  structure  for  their  funding,  principally  through  block  grants.  The 
Workforce  Development  Act  essentially  consolidates  more  than  100 federally  funded  training 
programs,  administered  by fifteen  different  federal  agencies  and  at a cost  of more  than  $20  billion 
annually.  The  idea  behind  this  law  was  to make  the U.S.  more  competitive  globally  by eliminating 
the  fragmentation  inherent  to the  old  training  system  and  create  “coherent,  integrated  statewide 
workforce  development  systems  designed  to develop  more  fully  the  academic,  occupational,  and 
literacy  skills  of all  segments  of the  workforce.” 
Consolidated  workforce  development  works  in much  the  same  way  as the  New  welfare. 
States  submit  plans  to a national  Governing  Board.  These  plans  detail  how  states,  after  they  have 
created  their  own  governing  boards,  intend  to implement  plans  for  the  development  of  their 
respective  workforces.  Just  as they  will  have  to with  the  new  welfare,  the  new  Workforce 
29 Development  Act  requires  states  to offer  a core  set of  set of  services  which  at a minimum  shall 
include:  outreach,  intake,  and  orientation  to whatever  information  and  services  are available 
through  one  stop  career  centers;  initial  assessment  of  skill  levels,  aptitudes  and  abilities  and 
supportive  service  needs;  job  search  and  placement  assistance  and  career  counseling  if 
appropriate;  customized  screening  and  referral  of qualified  applicants  to employment;  and  the 
provision  of  accurate  information  relating  to local  labor  market  conditions.  This  information 
would  include  profiles  of growth  industries  and  occupations  as well  as the  educational  and  skills 
requirements  of jobs  in those  industries  and  occupations,  and  their  earnings  potential. 
Though  they  aren’t  required  to,  states  are allowed  to provide  through  their  statewide 
systems:  on-the-job  training;  occupational  skills  training;  entrepreneurial  training;  training  to help 
workers  develop  work  habits  which  will  enable  them  to obtain  and  retain  employment;  rapid 
response  assistance  for  dislocated  workers;  skills  upgrading  and  retraining  for  those  not  in the 
workforce;  preemployment  and  work  maturity  skills  training  for  youth;  connecting  activities  that 
organize  consortia  of  small  and  medium  sized  businesses  to provide  work-based  learning 
opportunities  for  youth  in  school-to-work  programs;  programs  for  adults  that  would  combine 
workplace  training  with  related  instruction;  services  to assist  individuals  in attaining  certificates  of 
mastery  with  regards  to industry-based  skill  standards;  case  management  services;  supportive 
services  such  as transportation  and  financial  assistance  so that  individuals  can  participate;  and 
follow  up  services  for  those  who  are placed  in subsidized  employment.  Much  of this  already 
sounds  like  the  services  that  many  state  find  they  need  to provide. 
Ultimately,  however,  whatever  it is called,  workforce  development  involves  considerable 
emphasis  on  training.  And  to the  extent  that  welfare  recipients  will  under  the  new  welfare  be 
30 required  to participate  in education  and  training  programs,  the  new  welfare  effectively  moves  in 
the  same  direction.  Just  as the  new  welfare  returns  welfare  policy  to the  states  under  a uniform  set 
of Federal  regulations,  so too  does  the  new  law  on  workforce  development.  The  question, 
however,  is why  workforce  development,  welfare  reform  and  unemployment  insurance  should  be 
operated  as separate  entities.  If the  goal  of  the  new  welfare  is to end  dependency  and  foster  a 
greater  work  ethic,  this  goal  needs  to be tied  more  closely  with  existing  policy  aimed  at 
developing  the  workforce.  Not  only  would  this  lead  to greater  efficiency  in the  delivery  of public 
services,  it would  end  the  stigma  already  attached  to welfare.  Instead  of viewing  this  as welfare 
policy  with  new  flexibility,  we  should  look  at it as an opportunity  to end  the  artificial  distinction 
between  UI  and  welfare.  The  reason  for  the  initial  bifurcation  was  to generate  a base  of political 
support  for  a set of  measures  that  historically  speaking  were  anomalous.  The  public  would  be 
willing  to  support  social  security  because  it paid  into  it. It would  be willing  to support  UI  because 
it was just  that  -- insurance  which  it worked  for  (Weir,  Orloff,  & Skocpol,  1988).  But  the  public 
now  supports  work  for  welfare  recipients,  and  it makes  no  sense  to continue  the  stigma  currently 
attached  to  welfare.  The  goal  is to enable  people  to work  and  to indeed  facilitate  that  process. 
The  opportunity  to improve  on  the  new  welfare  legislation,  as the  Clinton  administration  has 
promised,  may  finally  present  the  nation  with  an opportunity  to create  more  comprehensive 
employment  programs.  But  in order  for  the  concept  of work  and  employment  policy  to replace 
the  concept  of  welfare  and  public  assistance  policy,  there  needs  to be in place  a new  institutional 
structure. 
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Notes 
1. This  figure  is derived  from  multiplying  the cost  per  case  by the  national  caseload,  which 
according  to unpublished  tables  by Administration  for Children  and  Families  in the  Department  of 
Health  and  Human  services  was  4.8 18 million.  This  estimate  represents  an average.  It does  not 
take  into  account  cost  of  living  disparities  or the  different  costs  associated  with  addressing 
entrenched  social  pathologies.  Therefore,  $15,070  per  case  might  overstate  the  costs  in places  like 
Arkansas  and  Mississippi  but  understate  them  in places  like  New  York  and  California. 
2. This  is based  on  a personal  communication  with  the  House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  in 
Congress  that  indicated  that  legal  immigrants  only  accounted  for  seven  percent  of  the  old  AFDC 
caseload. 
3. These  figures  are drawn  from  the  1996  Green  Book,  p. 459 
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